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45 
INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING 
TO ENSURE DRUG SAFETY AND 
EFFICACY  
 
MARC A. RODWIN* 
 
I.      REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MANUFACTURER 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
 
Drug manufacturers face a fundamental conflict of interest. Pursuit of 
profit compromises drug manufacturers’ impartial assessment of the risks 
and benefit of their drugs.1 Their biased evaluation can corrupt public 
knowledge of drugs, lead to marketing unsafe and/or ineffective drugs, and 
undermine rational physician prescribing.2 Over the last century, federal 
regulation has mitigated, but not eliminated, this problem.3 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Marc A. Rodwin. 
* Marc A. Rodwin, J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.  Research on 
this Article was funded by a grant from the Harvard University Edmond J. Safra Center Lab on 
Institutional Corruption and a Suffolk University Law School Summer research fund.  Thanks are 
due to Patrick O’Leary for research on congressional hearings.  This article is a revised version of 
Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS 
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113 (2012). 
 1. The conflicts of drug firms are, in part, conflicts of interest that affect medical practice in 
general. See MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE 
UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (Oxford University Press, 2011); MARC A. RODWIN, 
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (Oxford University 
Press, 1993). For application of conflict of interest analysis in the pharmaceutical sectors, see 
Karine Morin et al., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 
JOURNAL AM. MED. ASS’N 78, 80 (2002) (focusing on conflicts specifically between 
pharmaceutical companies and the testing of new drugs). 
 2. See Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An 
Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511–12 (2012); Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out 
Institutional Corruption to Manage Inappropriate Off-label Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654 
(2013); see also, Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000) (highlighting several 
instances in which researchers have been more willing to promote a drug or claim that it was 
effective if they were funded by pharmaceutical companies). 
 3. See e.g., Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770 
(1906) (repealed 1938) (representing the first major piece of reform). There is growing literature 
analyzing problems with drug safety and current practices in pharmaceutical industry research and 
marketing. See generally JOHN ABRAMSON, OVERDO$ED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF 
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Several policies counter this conflict of interest.4 Nevertheless, when 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) considers whether to approve 
sale of a drug, it relies upon clinical trials designed and controlled by the 
drug sponsor.5 An ample record reveals that drug firms can design clinical 
trials in ways that bias the conclusions,6 can misinterpret or misreport the 
trial data, or can engage in fraud.7 
 
AMERICAN MEDICINE (HarperCollins, 2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG 
COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (paperback ed. 2005); JERRY 
AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
(Knopf, 2004); HOWARD BRODY, HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, AND THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 
MILLION DOLLAR PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS (University of California 
Press, 2004); DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON (University of California Press, 2012); DONALD 
W. LIGHT, THE RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Columbia University Press, 2010); THOMAS J. 
MOORE, PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: THE HIDDEN DANGERS IN YOUR MEDICINE CABINET 
(Simon & Schuster, 1998); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE 
WORLD'S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS 
(Nation Books, 2005); Marc-André Gagnon, Corporate Influence Over Clinical Research: 
Considering the Alternatives, 21 PRESCRIRE INT’L 191, 191–95 (2012) (comparing clinical 
research to a promotional campaign); Joel Lexchin, The Medical Profession and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Unhealthy Alliance, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 603, 603–16 
(1988) (highlighting how this problem is not just limited to the American medical industry by 
discussing the conflict between the Canadian Medical Association and the pharmaceutical 
industry); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped 
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429, 1429–33 (2007) 
(suggesting that drug companies often conduct and write studies and then pay academics to put 
their names on it very late in the process); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 
2006 12:00 PM),  http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/04/the-drug-
pushers/304714/ (describing the conflict created by pharmaceutical reps influencing doctors’ 
prescribing habits). Contra RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE REGULATION 
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (Yale University Press, 2006) (arguing that that the 
United States over-regulates the pharmaceutical industry). 
 4. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 54.1 (2013) (requiring clinicians involved in pharmaceutical 
research to disclose all financial connections to the sponsoring company, including payments and 
patents to try to reduce bias caused by financial ties); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS 
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
CLINICAL TRIALS (1998), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm0
73137.pdf (detailing industry guidelines dedicated to reducing statistical bias or manipulation  in 
research studies by pharmaceutical companies). 
 5. See Kristin Rising et al., Reporting Bias in Drug Trails Submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration: Review of Publication and Presentation, 5 PLOS MED. 1561, 1567–68 (2008) 
(showing how common it is for drug trails to be manipulated or biased when run by drug 
companies). 
 6. See Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA 
1069, 1069–71 (2008) (recalling particular issues when the drug company, Merck, had their own 
paid employees write studies regarding the effectiveness of one of their products, a practice that 
has also occurred at other companies); Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for 
Dissemination and Independent Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1593 (2011) (noting 
that public confidence in research had been shaken when companies have been shown to 
intentionally manipulate clinical research trials); Drummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials, 
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Manufacturer bias can slant research when it is performed either in-
house, or when manufacturers finance or manage external researchers.8 
Today, drug firms typically rely mainly on external researchers,9 using 
Contract Research Organizations (“CROs”), or university-based researchers 
to carry out clinical trials and/or to perform some or all of the analysis.10 
Drug firms may also contract with specialists to design trials.11 The 
corrupting influence persists because the drug sponsor chooses who will 
conduct the trials, and these researchers depend on the sponsor for their 
income;12 additionally, researchers report to the drug sponsor, not to the 
FDA.13 Researchers, therefore, have incentives to advance the goals of the 
drug sponsor and to follow the drug sponsor’s directives.14 
This Article explores a proposal that would preclude biased drug 
testing by removing all drug sponsor influence on the design and conduct of 
clinical trials for new drug applications (“NDAs”), a reform that would 
address the root of institutional corruption.15 Recently advocated by leading 
 
Drug Companies and the FDA, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 991, 998 (2007) (describing documented 
instances of physicians conducting studies on behalf of drug companies and intentionally 
administering competing drugs incorrectly to make the studied drug look more effective, or 
manipulating statistical analyses to show robust positive results). 
 7. See, e.g., Rennie, supra note 6, at 995–96 (recounting a time when the author, as an editor 
of a major medical journal, realized that two authors had published dramatically conflicting results 
in different journals at the same time). 
 8. See Angell, supra note 6 (discussing how Contract Research Organizations (“CROs”) are 
susceptible to bias by allowing manufactures near total control of study design and execution 
because drug companies are their only clients). 
 9. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1539–40 (2000) (observing how drug companies 
increasingly rely on CROs and site-management organizations (“SMOs”) to conduct research 
instead of traditional academic institutions). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. (describing how companies will have an external investigator design the trial if they 
lack internal personnel with the needed expertise, or will design the trial in-house and then submit 
it to investigators for review). 
 12. See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003) (discussing possible links between researchers 
in the biomedical field who are funded by drug sponsors and then achieve positive results in 
studies). 
 13. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to 
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 754 (2009) (observing that drug companies often 
include confidentiality clauses in contracts made with external researchers to prevent public or 
even private discussion of results). 
 14. See Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 1543 (noting that the pharmaceutical companies who 
provide all or some of a researcher’s financial support use the money as leverage when being 
presented with potentially unfavorable results). 
 15. The concept of institutional corruption has been developed by Lawrence Lessig and 
Dennis Thompson. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 231–34 (2011) (defining institutional corruption using 
examples from various governments around the world); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN 
CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 37–43 (1995) (using the example 
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scholars, the idea has a long history, yet was neglected for over half a 
century due to pharmaceutical industry opposition.  
 
A.      The Origins of Contemporary Pharmaceutical Regulation 
 
Before examining the oversight of clinical trials, let us briefly review 
the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry over the last century. In the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the drug market was premised on the 
doctrine of laissez-faire.16 Manufacturers did not have to test their drugs or 
disclose the ingredients, could make any therapeutic claim, and could sell 
any product directly to consumers.17 
Reformers and muckrakers—supported by the American Medical 
Association (“AMA”)—spearheaded the fight for federal drug 
regulations.18 In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, which 
required manufacturers to disclose therapeutic ingredients on the drug label, 
and prohibited the sale of adulterated, misbranded, or deleterious 
products.19 The law presumed that, with accurate labeling, individuals 
 
of five senators known as “The Keating Five” to describe institutional corruption); Dennis F. 
Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005) (developing additional insight into institutional corruption in the 
political sphere via campaign laws). For a review of institutional corruption and the 
pharmaceutical industry, see the special issue (Volume 41, Issue 3) of the Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics devoted to the Institutional Corruption and Pharmaceutical Industry. 
Symposium, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
544 (2012). For discussion of institutional corruption, see generally The Lab at Edmond J. Safra 
Center for Ethics, HARVARD UNIV., http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab (last visited Oct. 26, 
2014), which details the work of several researchers who are analyzing institutional corruption in 
the pharmaceutical economy and other areas of public life. 
 16. See HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND 
USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 187–212, 230–32 (1970) (discussing the history of food and drug 
law, and the Food and Drug Administration); PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: 
THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 11–94 (2003) (containing an 
overview of the history of Dr. Wiley, who developed the FDA); PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR 
MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1980) (illustrating that at the start of 
the 20
th
 century, patients could go directly to the pharmacy to buy drugs without a prescription, 
and pharmacists could promote wares they chose to sell). 
 17. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical 
Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1759 (1996) (noting that drug manufacturers in the early 20
th
 
century could claim that their product or an ingredient in it could cure cancer, even if there was no 
supporting evidence). 
 18. See DOWLING, supra note 16, at 155–56; see also HILTS, supra note 16, at 52 (describing 
how the American Medical Association forced congressional action by threatening their members’ 
lobbying of the Senate if a bill was not passed). 
 19. Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770 (1906) 
(repealed 1938). See also Merrill, supra note 17, at 1758 (reviewing the content of the Pure Food 
and Drug Act and discussing its impact in court cases). 
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could safely choose drugs.20 Advertising of therapeutic claims remained 
unregulated until the Shirley amendments in 1912 prohibited false and 
fraudulent statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of drugs.21 
Industry opposition blocked enactment of the Roosevelt 
administration’s 1933 bill to regulate drugs until a scandal in 1937.  In 
order to improve the flavor of a sulfa-based drug called sulfanilamide, the 
Massengill Company added a chemical that was toxic, causing the rapid 
death of 106 people who had ingested the drug.22 Congress then passed the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”), which required drug 
firms to seek FDA permission to market drugs, and which allowed the FDA 
60 days to deny authorization if it found that the drug was dangerous or 
improperly labeled.23 
Manufacturers then had incentives to conduct research and to evaluate 
their products.24 The marketing of Thalidomide led to the birth of children 
with severe deformations in multiple countries, and created pressure for 
stronger regulation.25 The 1962 amendments to the FDCA prohibited 
marketing of drugs unless the FDA granted approval, and the amendments 
removed the 60 day deadline for FDA review of new drugs.26 The 
amendments required drug sponsors to demonstrate that drugs are 
effective—not only safe—for a designated use.27 It also authorizes the FDA 
to withdraw its approval for drugs already on the market based on new 
evidence.28 Manufacturers are required to track drug distribution to 
facilitate recalls of unsafe products, and to follow FDA standards for good 
manufacturing practices.29 The law restricts promotion of drugs to 
 
 20. See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 4 (recalling that most consumers at the turn of the century 
chose drugs for themselves as opposed to a doctor choosing for them, so ensuring consumers 
knew what they were selecting and purchasing was a priority). 
 21. Pure Food Act Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416, 416–17 (1912). 
 22. See TEMIN, supra note 16, at 40–42 (providing more detail on the sulfanilamide scandal 
and how it was used to gain political support for drug regulation reform). 
 23. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 
(1938). 
 24. The 1938 Act did not require firms to show that their drugs were effective. See Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505 (requiring evaluation of whether a drug is safe for use, but 
not requiring evidence that it is effective). 
 25. TEMIN, supra note 16, at 123–24. 
 26. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780, 784 (1962) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)). For a history and analysis of the legislation, 
including how its development was impacted by tragic events, see Jerry Avorn, Learning about 
the Safety of Drugs—A Half-Century of Evolution, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 2151, 2151–53 (2011); 
Merrill, supra note 17, at 1764–65. 
 27. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 102(a)–(c) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C. (2006)). 
 28. Id. § 102(d). 
 29. Id. §§ 101, 103. 
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therapeutic uses approved by the FDA.30 Promotional materials must note 
risks, as well as benefits, and summarize side effects and 
contraindications.31 The FDA specifies what information the label must 
include, and labels must state the generic name, as well as the brand 
name.32 
In 1970, the FDA promulgated regulations that set standards for the 
evidence that manufacturers would have to submit in order to demonstrate 
that new drugs were safe and effective.33 Since then, testing of drugs follow 
set stages.34 After researchers have identified a potentially therapeutic 
molecule, they test its effects in laboratories on chemicals, cells, or 
tissues.35 The FDA then requires firms to test its drugs for toxicity on 
animals.36 Drug candidates that have not been ruled out due to toxicity or 
lack of efficacy can then be tested on humans in three phases.37 
In Phase I, researchers test the drug on a small number of human 
subjects only to determine whether it is toxic in humans, and if so, at what 
doses.38 Phase II testing consists of a clinical trial in a larger group of 
patients in order to measure its benefits and risks.39 Drugs that are not 
highly toxic are tested in Phase III clinical trials on a large number of 
human research subjects, and researchers then compare its effect with a 
control group.40 Typically, the control group uses a placebo or an 
 
 30. See Promotion of Unapproved Drugs and Medical Devices, News & Events, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (statement of William B. Schultz, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, FDA (Feb. 22, 
1996)), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2009). 
 31. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 131(a). 
 32. Id. §§ 112, 131. 
 33. See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short History, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/ucm304485.htm 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (providing a brief historical overview of legislative developments 
during the 1960s and 1970s and their corresponding impact on clinical drug trials). 
 34. See RICHARD E. ROWBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30913, PHARMACEUTICAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS 4–5 (2001) 
(discussing the phases of drug research). 
 35. For a description and history of the process used for drug development and testing drugs, 
see SUSAN ALDRIDGE, MAGIC MOLECULES: HOW DRUGS WORK (Cambridge University Press, 
1998) and JÜRGEN DREWS, IN QUEST OF TOMORROW’S MEDICINES (Springer-Verlag, 2003). 
 36. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 8 (describing how animal testing provides information 
on the immediate impact of the drug, long term effects, and even how the drug might impact 
pregnancy). 
 37. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2014). 
 38. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 9 (explaining how Phase I consists of 10 to 100 humans, 
and determining what range of dose concentrations do not produce unacceptable side effects). See 
also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (detailing Phase I of an investigation). 
 39. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10 (explaining how Phase II trials include 50 to 500 
humans to determine the effectiveness a drug). See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (explaining Phase 
II of an investigation). 
 40. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10–11; 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c). 
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alternative therapy.41 Human subjects are randomly assigned to either the 
test group or the control group.42 It is a double blind study, which means 
that the medication must be coded so that neither the physician who 
administers the drug, nor the individual taking the drug, knows which 
individuals receive the test drug and which individuals receive the placebo 
(or the standard therapy to which it is compared) until the code is broken 
after collection of data.43 To counter the risk of fraud or unreliable studies, 
regulations establish standards for research methods, record keeping, and 
data reporting.44 The FDA also inspects toxicological laboratories and 
facilities that conduct clinical trials in order to monitor compliance.45 
 
B.       Options for Control of Clinical Trials 
 
There are six options for addressing conflicts of interest in clinical 
trials, which are displayed in Table 1 below. At one extreme, the drug 
sponsor has complete control over clinical trials; at the other extreme, the 
federal government conducts the clinical trials. Between these two poles are 
four strategies that can be used individually or combined. The FDA relies 
mainly on the second strategy, which has been supplemented in recent years 
by the fourth strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41. ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 10. 
 42. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E10 CHOICE OF CONTROL GROUP 
AND RELATED ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS 3 (2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/uc
m073139.pdf. 
 43. See id. at 4 (explaining that the purpose of double blind studies is to minimize biases). 
 44. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.57, 314.126 (2010) (addressing recordkeeping, and adequate and 
well-controlled studies). 
 45. See OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICES, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (1981), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/UCM133748.
pdf; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INFORMATION SHEET 
GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FDA INSPECTIONS OF 
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126553.pdf. 
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TABLE 1: STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS DRUG SPONSOR 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
 
←Manufacturer Control                             Government Control→  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Drug firms 
conduct 
clinical 
trials with 
little 
regulation 
FDA 
regulates 
and 
oversees 
clinical 
trials that 
drug firms 
conduct 
Government 
or private 
entity 
certifies 
clinical 
researchers. 
Drug firms 
conduct 
clinical trials 
using 
certified 
researchers 
Government 
promotes 
transparency 
by requiring: 
(1) 
registration of 
trials;     
(2) disclosure 
of clinical 
study 
reports; or  
(3) disclosure 
of patient 
level data 
Government 
selects 
independent 
entities to 
conduct 
clinical trials 
Government 
agency 
conducts 
clinical trials 
 
 
The first option ignores the conflict of interest in allowing drug firms 
to oversee their own research, and permits the drug firm to conduct clinical 
trials without any oversight.46 The second strategy has the FDA regulate 
clinical trials that are conducted by drug firms, using standards for 
research.47 The third strategy requires that only certified research 
organizations and researchers conduct clinical trials.48 The fourth strategy 
promotes transparency of drug firm-sponsored research (since 2007, the 
United States has required registration of clinical trials to promote 
transparency49).50 The fifth strategy precludes drug firm bias by having the 
 
 46. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text (explaining the conflict of interest in 
allowing drug firms to oversee their own research). 
 47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining that this is the strategy that the FDA 
has taken). 
 48. See N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, The Importance of Clinical Testing in 
Determining the Efficacy and Safety of Drugs, 38 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 415, 420, 429 (1962) 
(explaining how there is no requirement for a tester to certify his professional qualifications, and 
articulating the need for establishing professional standards). 
 49. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 
801(j)(2)(C), 121 Stat. 823, 907–08. The push for registration of clinical trials emerged after 
studies showed the presence of biased information in published literature evaluating drugs. See 
An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in Randomized 
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federal government select independent researchers to design and conduct 
clinical trials.51 The sixth strategy mandates that the government agency 
conduct clinical trials.  
Until now, almost all regulations have employed the second strategy 
by setting technical standards for laboratory testing and clinical trials.52 
This strategy, however, could be further developed in new ways.53 For 
example, regulations could oversee financial relations between the drug 
 
Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 JAMA 2457, 2457–65 (2004) 
(explaining how drug firms published studies showing positive results but buried studies that show 
drugs’ ineffectiveness or high risks, causing medical journal editors to promote clinical trial 
registration to increase access to data). In 2004, the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors agreed that their journals would not publish clinical trial results unless the trial was 
registered before patients enrolled. Catherine DeAngelis et al., Editorial, Clinical Trial 
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250–51 (2004). The Committee of Editors decided that registries should 
include data specified by the World Health Organization (“WHO”). See WHO Trial Registration 
Data Set, International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (“ICTRP”), WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/trds/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) 
(setting forth the minimum amount of trial information required to appear for a trial to be 
considered fully registered by the WHO).  
Current law requires registering certain trials on the ClinicalTrials.gov website if the trial is part of 
an FDA investigation of a new drug application, or if there is a trial site in the U.S. In addition, 
researchers must post key results within a year after collecting data. Researchers have up to three 
years, however, to post results for studies of off-label drug uses (i.e., uses other than those the 
FDA has approved). See Michael R. Law et al., Despite Law, Fewer than One in Eight Completed 
Studies of Drugs and Biologics are Reported on Time on ClinicalTrials.gov, 30 HEALTH AFF. 
2338, 2338–39 (2011) (stating that while the federal government mandates that clinical trials be 
registered, researchers are permitted to a three year delay).  Nevertheless, registration practice 
falls short of what the law requires. See id. (finding that 39% of trials were registered late, while 
only 12% of completed studies registered their results within the year); Sylvain Mathieu et al., 
Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized Controlled Trials, 
302 JAMA 977, 977 (2009) (stating that registration requirements typically were ignored, and 
were the exception to the rule rather than the norm). Moreover, current law and policy impedes 
access to information on drug safety. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality 
Laws and Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on Drug Safety, 26 
HEALTH AFF. 483, 487  (2007) (explaining how current law and policy impedes access to 
information on drug safety). 
 50. See Galbraith, supra note 13, at 768 (2009) (describing how increased transparency would 
help increase public trust and interest); Ida Sim et al., Comment, Clinical Trial Registration: 
Transparency is the Watchword, 367 LANCET 1631, 1631 (2006) (“Transparency [of clinical 
trials] is the best antidote to such free-floating distrust.”). 
 51. See Rennie, supra note 6, at 1010 (arguing for a separate and independent entity of 
researchers to engage in trials, who would be prohibited from receiving funds from 
pharmaceutical companies as a way to preclude drug firm bias). 
 52. See Galbraith, supra note 13, at 713–14 (2009) (explaining the FDA’s role in setting the 
prerequisites that pharmaceutical companies must substantiate in claiming that a drug is safe and 
effective); Rennie, supra note 6, at 1003 (2007) (describing the role of the FDA and the standards 
for trials). 
 53. See infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
  
54 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:45 
sponsor and researchers.54 Regulations could also preclude individuals and 
firms from conducting a clinical trial if either have significant financial 
conflicts of interest.55  
Some reformers in the 1960s and 1970s advocated for certification of 
researchers (the third strategy),56 but the United States has not pursued this 
approach.57 Regulations could authorize the federal government or private 
organizations to certify researchers, and to require that only certified 
researchers and organizations conduct drug trials used to support NDAs.58 
To strengthen the transparency strategy, regulations could require that 
drug sponsors and their researchers make the clinical study report public 
(which drug firms currently only supply to the FDA) in order to comply 
with the FDA rules and international standards.59 Clinical study reports 
contain key information related to the clinical trial, including: the study 
protocol, the designated clinical end points, discussion of methods and 
statistical analysis, tabulated data, and analysis of data.60 Regulations could 
also require disclosure of clinical trial patient level data.61 Making detailed 
 
 54. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND 
INTERESTS IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS: GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SUBJECT 
PROTECTION 5–6 (2004), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/humansubjects/finreltn/fguid.pdf (raising points to consider 
when determining whether specific financial interests in research affect human subjects’ rights 
and welfare, and which approaches should subsequently be taken to protect those subjects). 
 55. See id. (explaining how conflicts of interest may be managed by eliminating or mitigating 
financial interests). 
 56. See N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, supra note 48, at 433–34 (urging that 
clinical testing be formally recognized as a medical specialty, and noting specific requirements for 
certification). 
 57. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 312.70 (2014) (describing the selection process of investigators 
and monitors). There is still no guidance on the certification of researchers, but the FDA can bar 
researchers from conducting clinical trials used to support new drug applications. Id. 
 58. See Rennie, supra note 6, at 1010. 
 59. See Guideline for Industry: Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports, 61 Fed. Reg. 
37,320, 37,322 (July 17, 1996) (stating that currently, requirements for data presentation vary 
widely); Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations 
from the Tamiflu Experience, 10 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2012) (explaining how the European Medicines 
Agency has recently started to make clinical trial reports available when they are requested under 
public disclosure statutes); Marc A. Rodwin & John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public 
Good, 308 JAMA 871, 871 (2012) (indicating that John Abramson and I have called for 
legislation to require mandatory disclosure of clinical study reports for FDA approved drugs); 
Press Release, European Meds. Agency, Medicines Agency Widens Public Access to Documents 
(Nov. 30, 2010) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Press_release/2010/11/WC500099468.
pdf. 
 60. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 801, 121 
Stat. 823, 904–22 (2007).  
 61. See Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for Dissemination and Independent 
Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1594 (2011) (stating that a complete release of 
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information public on clinical trials would allow independent researchers to 
review the analysis, or to perform their own evaluation. Proponents of this 
approach say that it would make it harder for drug sponsors to hide risks 
from the public, and that it would also help to hold the FDA accountable for 
its decisions.62 
New regulations that advanced the second, third, and fourth strategies 
would not remove the drug sponsor bias. Consequently, some critics have 
proposed ending the drug sponsor’s control over clinical trials that the FDA 
uses to evaluate drugs.63 This reform can be implemented through the fifth 
strategy (having the federal government contract with independent 
organizations to design and conduct clinical trials), or through the sixth 
strategy (having the federal government conduct the clinical trials). Under 
most formulations of these proposals, the drug sponsor would finance the 
drug testing, just as they currently do. Some proposals, however, would 
have the pharmaceutical industry collectively finance the testing; others 
propose that the federal government share the costs of drug testing with the 
pharmaceutical industry collectively, or with the drug sponsor.64 
 
C.      Contemporary Proposals for Independent Drug Testing 
 
In the last two decades, several authors have called for independent 
drug testing. These proposals are supported by scholarly literature that 
documents publication bias as well as biased research design in drug 
company-controlled trials.65 In 2004, Dr. Marcia Angell proposed the 
 
patient-level data addresses industry and societal concerns, and that the “way forward” is to 
disclose clinical trial patient level data). 
 62. See id. at 1593–94 (proposing a model that emphasizes independence, transparency, 
fairness, and reproducibility, which would allow for the release and review of findings, and further 
instill confidence in the public that efforts are not being manipulated by funding or coordinating 
organizations). 
 63. See Sheldon Krimsky, Publication Bias, Data Ownership, and the Funding Effect in 
Science: Threats to the Integrity of Biomedical Research, RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: 
REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 61, 81 (Wendy Wagner & Rena 
Steinzor eds., 2006) (proposing an independent institute that would contract with independent 
researchers and would not be controlled by the sponsoring company); Catherine D. DeAngelis, 
Conflict of Interest and the Public Trust, 284 JAMA 2237, 2238 (2000) (“When an investigator 
has a financial interest in or funding by a company with activities related to his or her research, the 
research is lower in quality, [and is] more likely to favor the sponsor’s product . . . .”). 
 64. See infra Parts II, III (discussing contemporary proposals). 
 65. See Lisa Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published Drug Studies, 
12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209, 211 (1996) (stating that the most serious 
threat to the quality of drugs arise out of systematic bias introduced during the research process); 
Peter C. Gøtzsche, Methodology and Overt and Hidden Bias in Reports of 196 Double-Blind 
Trials of Nonsteroidal Antiinflammatory Drugs in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 10 CONTROLLED 
CLINICAL TRIALS 31, 51 (1989) (finding that hidden biases, which are difficult to detect, and overt 
biases existed in the design of clinical studies); P.C. Waller et al., Review of Company 
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creation of an Institute for Prescription Drug Trials within the National 
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) that would oversee the clinical trials.66 This 
proposal projected that the NIH would carry out the research through 
independent researchers at universities.67 The data would belong to the 
institute and the researchers, and the results would be public.68 The FDA 
would then rely on these studies to decide whether or not to authorize the 
marketing of the drug.69 To fund the institute, drug firms would be assessed 
a percentage of their gross revenues.70 
In 1993, Doctors Wayne Ray, Marie Griffin, and Jerry Avorn 
proposed creating a governmental center that would assess drug 
effectiveness and compare the costs and benefits of alternative drug 
therapies.71 The center would fund and/or conduct studies of drugs already 
approved for sale, and coordinate drug research performed by government 
agencies.72 The authors would finance the center through a tax on drug 
sales and third-party payer subscription fees.73 
In 1996, Doctors Lisa Bero and Drummond Rennie advocated for 
legislation that would support independent studies of drug cost 
effectiveness and comparative effectiveness that would be funded by a user 
fee on pharmaceutical firms.74 In 2007, Dr. Rennie argued that the United 
States should create a federally financed National Institute of Clinical 
Trials.75 This institute would decide what trials to conduct and would make 
 
Postmarketing Surveillance Studies, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 1470, 1470–71 (1992) (arguing that post-
marketing studies have made a limited contribution to the assessment of drug safety overall). 
 66. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 244–45 (paperback ed. 2005). 
 67. Id. at 245. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 245–46 (explaining that the Institute for Prescription Drug Trials would oversee 
clinical trials before FDA approval, rather than after). 
 70. Id. at 245. Dr. Angell summarizes problems with industry sponsored clinical trials. See 
generally Angell, supra note 6, at 1070 (discussing conflicts of interest that exist within industry 
sponsored drug research). For a review of problems with industry funded trials, see Thomas 
Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000). 
 71. Wayne A. Ray et al., Sounding Board: Evaluating Drugs After Their Approval for 
Clinical Use, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2031 (1993). Their proposal incorporated parts of the 
FDCA amendments proposed in 1974 and 1978, the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use’s 
1980 recommendations, and Senator David Pryor’s proposed Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent 
Purchasing Act of 1990. Id. at 1031. 
 72. Id. at 2030–31. 
 73. Id. at 2031. 
 74. Bero & Rennie, supra note 65, at 229. Several other physicians have called for increasing 
funding for clinical trials to improve pharmaceutical policy and clinical care. See Alastair J.J. 
Wood et al., Sounding Board: Making Medicines Safer—The Need for an Independent Drug 
Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. MED. J. 1851, 1852 (1998) (proposing the creation of an 
independent drug safety board to evaluate drugs). 
 75. Rennie, supra note 6, at 1009–11. 
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grants to researchers.76 Researchers would receive all of their funds through 
their institutions and would not be allowed to receive other funds.77 
A group of scholars interested in public goods and intellectual property 
have also called for publicly funded clinical trials to ensure unbiased 
evaluation, and to reduce the cost of drug development.78 They argue that if 
clinical trials were publicly funded, it would be unnecessary to grant patents 
or exclusive marketing periods to drug firms—at the very least, we could 
shorten the duration of the monopoly.79 Additionally, these scholars note 
that lower prices would increase access to pharmaceuticals globally.80 
Most contemporary proponents of independent testing, however, are 
either not aware, or have forgotten, that Congress considered similar 
proposals between the late 1950s and 1980.81 
 
 76. Id. at 1010–11. 
 77. Id. (arguing that such a system would allow for greater credibility). 
 78. See e.g., Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of 
Clinical Trials, THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1–4 (arguing that independent drug 
testing conducted by the federal government would eliminate a conflict of interest, which exists 
between the drug manufacturers and drug testers). 
 79. See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and Vaccines, 
18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 162–63 (2009) (stating that prizes could be a viable alternative to 
granted exclusive rights); Tracy R. Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good: The 
Most Logical Reform 3 (Sept. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of 
California Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3cn7258n (arguing that the elimination of drug production 
monopolies would benefit both health care providers and customers in terms of cost). 
 80. See Love & Hubbard, supra note 79, at 171–72 (stating that a drug price decrease of 95% 
to 99% is feasible if greater competition were allowed in the development of medicines, allowing 
for greater access to drugs, especially those used to treat serious conditions); James Love & Tim 
Hubbard, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147, 150 
(2004) (arguing that greater competition in drug research and development will allow for new 
medical inventions at marginal costs, allowing resources to be allocated to those areas with the 
greatest needs); Comment to the World Health Org. Intergovernmental Working Grp. on Pub. 
Health, Innovation & Intellectual Prop., James Love, Knowledge Ecology Int’l (Sept. 30, 2007) 
(on file with the World Health Org.), available at 
http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section2/Section2_JamesLove-
KEI_prizes.pdf (eliminating market exclusivity for prescription drugs would create greater supply 
and access to medical devices and products, and could have a dramatic change on the global 
market for pharmaceutical drugs). 
 81. See Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics), Part 24: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 13934–35 
(1960) [hereinafter Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24] (indicating that Senator Kefauver had 
introduced the bill calling for drug testing to be conducted by the FDA); Competitive Problems in 
the Drug Industry, Parts 1–34: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 90–96th Congress (1967–79); Interagency Coordination in Drug Research 
and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Reorganization & Int’l Orgs. of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 88th Cong. 790 (1963) 
[hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3]; Preclinical and Clinical Testing by 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. 
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II.      THE STALLED REFORM: PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG 
TESTING FROM 1959–1980 
 
Between 1959 and 1980, Congress, the FDA, industry advocates, and 
consumer advocates debated how drugs should be tested.82 Hearings 
chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN), Hubert H. Humphrey (D-WI), 
Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and Ted Kennedy (D-MA) document their 
views.83 The hearings revealed two main problems with relying on 
manufacturer testing: (1) the economic incentives of drug firms 
compromised their impartiality, biased the design of the clinical trials, and 
sometimes led to fraud;84 and (2) testing laboratories and investigators 
performed shoddy work because they lacked training, and cut corners to 
boost income.85 By 1960, the FDA found that many NDAs were based on 
poorly designed and implemented studies.86 FDA investigations and 
congressional hearings revealed fraud by testing laboratories, physician 
investigators, and drug firms, finding quality problems that compromised 
the reliability of testing.87 The FDA developed regulations to address these 
 
on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1].  
 82. See, e.g., Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81; Drug Research & 
Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81; Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, 
supra note 81. 
 83. See sources cited supra note 81. 
 84. The FDA had noted problems with fraud, bias, and poor study design even before 1961. 
See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, 
Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization & Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Gov’t 
Operations, 87th Cong. 32 (1962) (statement of William S. Middleton, Chief Medical Director, 
Veterans’ Administration); Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency 
Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization & Int’l Org. of the 
S. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 87th Cong. 373, 375 (1962) [hereinafter Drug Research & 
Regulation Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Mr. William Weiss, Bureau of Program Planning and 
Appraisal, Food and Drug Administration). 
 85. See MORTON MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE: A REPORT ON THE ROLES OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 
PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, AND OTHERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRRATIONAL AND 
MASSIVE USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THAT MAY BE WORTHLESS, INJURIOUS, OR EVEN 
LETHAL (Houghton Mifflin, 1965); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105 (1984) (explaining that data could be fabricated both to meet 
particular deadlines as well as to produce results that were favorable to the manufacturer); 
MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS, AND POLITICS 137 (1974) (stating that 
there are few research workers with both the competence and motivation to properly conduct 
clinical tests). 
 86. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81, at 782 (finding that 
many new drugs did not have sufficient data to establish that the particular drug was both safe and 
effective). 
 87. Id. at 792 (illustrating expert testimony that revealed that approved drugs had been 
improperly investigated by investigators with questionable qualifications); see also Drug 
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problems.88 The standards for drug testing became more rigorous and FDA 
oversight increased, but congressional hearings revealed that many 
problems still persisted.89 
 
A.      1959–1961: The Kefauver Hearings and Other Proposals 
 
Senator Estes Kefauver held hearings on the pharmaceutical industry 
from 1959 to 1961.90 In testimony, Dr. Maxwell Finland, associate 
professor at Harvard Medical School, proposed having the NIH set up study 
sections to evaluate drugs.91 That way, as Dr. Finland notes, “the 
endorsement of inferior products that are not in the best interest of the 
public[ ] is much less likely to occur than when the support for testing the 
product is furnished by the individual producer.”92 Dr. Finland also warned 
of risks when university researchers depended on drug firm grants.93 He 
said that “ . . . departments of clinical pharmacology[ ] should not 
depend . . . on funds that come from individual drugs, because . . . some 
people cannot perhaps divorce their judgment from the sources of their 
 
Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 84, at 375 (describing how in one expert’s 
opinion, unconscious bias rather than overt fraud provides the greatest opportunity for poor testing 
of new drugs). These problems led many people to conclude that the federal government should 
either test drugs or contract with independent parties to design and carry out the clinical trials. See 
Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933 (statement of Maxwell Finland, 
Associate Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School) (noting that the National Institutes of 
Health could oversee the testing of new drugs, ensuring a proper supply of materials and qualified 
staff to conduct studies). 
 88. See, e.g., Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last 
updated Mar. 25, 2014) (showing that in 1962, the FDA passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug 
Amendments to ensure drug efficacy and greater safety). 
 89. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, supra note 81, at 11–12 (discussing 
issues in scientific data retrieval, which existed within the FDA). 
 90. The hearing initially focused on market competition, but after the Thalidomide disaster, 
they focused on drug safety issues, including drug testing. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 
24, supra note 81, at 13609, 13943, 14041 (discussing the need for competent expert research into 
whether drugs are safe for the general public). The hearings and recommendations were 
summarized in SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST & MONOPOLY, ADMINISTERED PRICES: DRUGS, S. 
REP. NO. 87-448, at 245 (1961). For an engaging popular account of the hearings on the 
pharmaceutical industry chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, see RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL 
VOICE (Macmillan 1964). 
 91. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933 (explaining that the 
National Institutes of Health would assign funds to testing centers with proper qualifications to 
conduct clinical tests). Dr. Finland discusses this proposal and other issues in an article that 
appeared while Senators Gaylord Nelson and Ted Kennedy were investigating the pharmaceutical 
industry. See Maxwell Finland, Clinical Investigation of New Antimicrobial Agents, 120 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 620 (1969). 
 92. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13933. 
 93. Id. at 13934. 
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support.”94 Senator Kefauver added that “the efficacy of drugs should be 
tested by the Food and Drug Administration.”95 Dr. Finland believed, 
however, that it would be preferable to have an independent entity carry out 
the study in order to avoid having an FDA scientist evaluate the agency’s 
research.96 
In 1960, Alek Rozental, an economics professor at Saint Louis 
University, published “The Strange Ethics of the Ethical Pharmaceutical 
Industry” in Harper’s Magazine.97 To ensure drug safety, Rozental wrote 
that the United States should follow the 1959 proposal of the United 
Kingdom’s Hinchliffe committee on drug safety and cost.98 Rozental 
recommended that “all new drugs . . . be subject to independent clinical 
trials preferably conducted by a central organization, to be financed by the 
industry.”99 
 
B.      1962–1963: The Humphrey Hearings 
 
Senator Hubert Humphrey chaired hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Reorganization and International Organizations from August of 1962 
through 1964.100 The committee examined three key questions: (1) what 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Alek A. Rozental, The Strange Ethics of the Ethical Drug Industry, HARPER’S MAG., 
May 1960, at 73, 73 (discussing the need for reform of the drug industry to better serve doctors 
and patients in light of the large profits drug companies were making at the time). 
 98. Id. at 84. 
 99. Id. Rozental suggested that another option that might generate less political opposition 
would be to create an independent profession of clinical testers, akin to certified public 
accountants serving as independent auditors. Id. 
 100. See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination 
Study, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. 
on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation 
Hearings, Part 1 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: 
Agency Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l 
Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug 
Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug 
Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) 
[hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.)]; Interagency 
Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 4: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Governmental 
Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th 
Cong.)]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination 
Study, Part 5: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. 
on Governmental Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research & Regulation 
Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.)]. The Humphrey hearings began after the Kefauver hearings 
(1959–1961), but before Congress passed the 1962 FDA amendments.   
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role should the federal government play in testing drugs or setting standards 
for drug testing; (2) which organizations should conduct clinical tests; and 
(3) what qualifications should individuals have to conduct clinical trials?101 
When the hearings began, the FDA had not yet developed regulations 
specifying how drugs should be tested under the 1962 FDA amendments.102 
The 1938 Food and Drug Act provided that manufacturers had to select 
reliable investigators, specifying that these reliable investigators needed to 
be experts qualified by scientific training.”103 The FDA declined to specify 
criteria that qualified individuals as experts, explaining that it was not 
authorized to control the practice of medicine.104 
Prior to regulations in 1970, there was little distinction between 
physicians and investigators.105 Drug firms would frequently give 
investigational drugs to several practitioners to test on their patients. 
Pharmaceutical firms would draw on their reports or testimonials when 
submitting NDAs. The FDA recommended that specialists test the drugs in 
the diseases for which that drug would be used, and that firms employ 
several investigators, each of which would work independently in different 
locations to ensure a balanced assessment.106 Drug testing, however, was 
often not clearly separated from marketing.107 In 1960, Dr. Mendel C. 
Sheps from the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine wrote that “the 
scientific requirements for careful investigation . . . compete with high-
pressure marketing demands.”108 In fact, he continued, “the responsibility 
for arranging . . . the first trials on human beings is at times given to detail 
men.”109 
 
 101. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 1 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 57–58. 
 102. The FDA proposed regulations setting standards for conducting clinical trials in 1970. 
Hearing Requests on Refusal or Withdrawal of New Drug Applications and Issuance, Amendment 
or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations and Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and 
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 3073–74 (proposed Feb. 17, 1970) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 130, 146). 
 103. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1053 
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2013). 
 104. N.Y. Acad. of Med. Comm. on Pub. Health, supra note 48, at 420. 
 105. See id. at 429 (noting that a physician “tacitly qualifies himself” as an investigator and 
that there is limited oversight of a physician’s proper qualifications to be an investigator, thus 
blurring the line between physician and investigator). 
 106. Id. at 420. 
 107. Drug Research & Regulations Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1590 
(explaining that high-pressure marketing demands often influenced the clinical testing and 
perceived worthiness of drugs). 
 108. Id. (explaining that clinical studies served a dual purpose: not only were they arranged to 
gain scientific insight on the “clinical worthiness” of the said drug, but they also attempted to 
promote the drug to the medical profession to gain their acceptance and support). 
 109. Id. 
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The hearing record included the New York Academy of Medicine’s 
1962 report on drug testing, which found that many tests were substandard 
because investigators lacked training or experience in designing studies, or 
in recording and reporting results.110 The record noted that neither the 
FDA, nor any other official or professional body, had set standards for 
clinical investigators.111 The report recommended that investigators should 
have training in clinical research, that pharmaceutical firms’ medical 
directors should have experience in clinical testing, and that the research 
should take place in hospitals.112 
The report rejected two proposals, however, that would shift 
responsibility from drug firms to the federal government. The first proposal 
would establish a “national central office on testing . . . [that would] arrange 
to conduct and supervise the testing of all products.”113 The report argued 
that a national center would be overly bureaucratic, which would be 
unacceptable to pharmaceutical manufacturers and clinicians.114 The 
second proposal, modeled on the AMA Committee on Therapeutic Trials, 
would establish a national referral agency for clinical investigators.115 The 
report also did not support this idea due to the failure of the AMA’s earlier 
testing plan.116 
In 1963, Consumers Union, which had built its reputation as an 
independent tester of consumer products, evaluated the 1962 FDA 
amendments in its journal, Consumer Reports. Consumer Unions said that 
the “fundamental question” is this: “is it good public policy to permit the 
drug manufacturers to do or to supervise the clinical testing of their own 
products?”117 Consumers Union argued that since the FDA relied on reports 
“procured by the manufacturers,” the arrangement was an inadequate 
substitute for “an objective testing agency.”118 In Senate testimony, 
Consumers Union called for the creation of an independent government 
 
 110. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 528, 536. 
 111. Id. at 531. Note that professional organizations did ultimately consider establishing their 
own guidelines. The American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, for 
example, considered the question of whether qualifying boards should be established in clinical 
pharmacology. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 
1607. The institution ultimately decided against it, however, concluding that a certification system 
for scientists’ conduct of research had “no acceptable precedent.” Id. 
 112. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 2 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 539–40. 
 113. Id. at 538. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Drug Safety, CONSUMER REPS., Mar. 1963, at 134, 136. 
 118. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1052. 
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agency to test drugs that would produce all of the data that the FDA would 
use when deciding whether or not to approve new drugs for marketing.119 
Dr. Charles May, professor of pediatrics at the New York University 
School of Medicine, called for increased clinical testing by publicly funded 
researchers.120 Dr. May proposed the creation of publicly funded, 
autonomous drug testing centers located at medical-school-affiliated-
hospitals,121 where the facilities and core staff would be publicly funded.122 
In Dr. May’s proposal, the FDA or other agencies would provide grants for 
individual research projects, and investigators would choose research 
projects based on scientific merit.123 
Several other physicians suggested that there should be a separation 
between firms sponsoring a new drug and researchers testing the drug.124 
One idea was to have the industry pool funds for testing new drugs.125 
More frequently, physicians have proposed even greater separation.126 Dr. 
George Baehr, Chair of the New York State Public Health Council, 
proposed testing drugs only in FDA-approved trial centers located in 
teaching hospitals.127 Dr. M. Harold Book of Kings Park State Hospital 
wrote, “the preliminary testing on human patients . . . should be assigned to 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1034, 1053–54 (explaining that clinical testing should be conducted in New 
Treatment Centers by publically funded researchers such as clinicians, pharmacologists, or any 
specialists the studies required). 
 121. Dr. May summarized his ideas in a March 1963 memorandum and subsequent hearing 
testimony. Id. at 1044–45, 1053–54 (explaining that his proposal would be to create new centers 
for drug research in medical institutions, starting with a few, and expanding the program to other 
facilities if the launching of the program is successful).   
 122. Id. at 1054. 
 123. Id. (explaining that the choice, control, and initiative of choosing research projects would 
remain with the investigators who are supported by basic grants). 
 124. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1617–18, 
1620, 1625–28, 1631–34, 1636, 1639 (highlighting a collection of correspondence from scientists 
and other sources that suggest sponsors of drugs should be separate from those researching the 
drugs). 
 125. Dr. Keith J.B. Wightman of the University of Toronto proposed that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers create and collectively fund a foundation that would help design studies, identify 
investigators and facilities, and publish the results. The president of the American Society for 
Clinical Investigation supported a proposal to replace the practice of having individual drug firms 
directly pay investigators; in its place, a board of impartial scientists and public and industry 
representatives should disburse payments to drug testers from a common fund supported by 
pharmaceutical firms. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note 
100, at 2419–20 (statement of Irving M. London, President, Am. Society for Clinical 
Investigation). 
 126. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1617–
18, 1620, 1625–28, 1631–34, 1636, 1639 (addressing physicians’ proposals to conduct clinical 
drug testing independent from manufacturer control). 
 127. Id. at 1641 (explaining that all drugs should be clinically tested in FDA-approved trial 
centers located at teaching hospitals of medical schools before being released for sale). 
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some independent noncommercial agency and not to any individuals or 
groups who are dependent . . . for financial support on pharmaceutical 
houses.”128 Doctors I.H. Page and Ray W. Gifford, Jr. of the Cleveland 
Clinic wrote that “an independent agency [should] be created to receive and 
administer funds to pay the costs of drug testing.”129 
During this period, there were numerous examples of fraud in 
pharmaceutical firm-sponsored testing.130 In 1962, reports of harmful side 
effects from the use of MER/29 (triparanol), a drug marketed to reduce 
blood cholesterol, led the manufacturer, which was a subsidiary of 
Richardson-Merrell, to stop selling the drug.131 Investigations later found 
fraudulent reporting of the toxicological studies.132 Investigations by the 
FDA and other federal agencies revealed fraudulent reporting of the 
toxicological studies by university based researchers.133 There were also 
reports of bias arising from drug company sponsorships of drug trials, and 
the trade press reported on “rigging” of research.134 A 1963 New England 
Journal of Medicine editorial criticized firms that set unethical publication 
restrictions, specifically those who only permitted publication of positive 
results.135 
In the 1964 hearings, Senator Humphrey reported the views of 
professionals on how drug firms’ payments to clinical investigators might 
compromise their objectivity.136 Dr. Edward Adelson, of the George 
Washington University School of Medicine, wrote that “an investigator 
who depends on drug funds . . . knows that if he hopes to get further 
grants[,] it would be better to obtain results proving [that] the drug . . . is a 
good one.”137 Dr. George E. Schreiner, head of the American Federation 
 
 128. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 2285. 
 129. Id. at 2296. 
 130. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 51–54 (illustrating the problem of dishonesty in the 
investigation of new drug usage through examples of fraudulent clinical trials). 
 131. Id. at 60 (emphasizing that this MER/29 case was one of the most shocking case of fraud 
in the area of safety testing of drugs). 
 132. Id. at 62 (noting that Richardson-Merrell’s reports of a chronic toxicity study in monkeys 
was fraudulent, and served as count three in the charges against them and the eventual downfall of 
the MER/29 drug). 
 133. Id. at 58–59. 
 134. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 975–
76 (Exhibit 137, excerpt from Drug Trade News) (explaining that many drug testers test with 
predetermined results to ensure a drug is permissible for consumption). 
 135. Regarding the Clinical Test, 268 NEW ENG. J. MED. 680, 680 (1963).   
 136. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1641–51 
(Exhibit 206) (noting a variety of letters and comments from various medical professionals on 
their personal experience with bias in the drug testing profession). 
 137. Id. at 1647. 
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for Clinical Research, wrote “that when there is direct payment from drug 
firms, there may be too much temptation to turn in a favorable report.”138 
At the conclusion of the 1964 hearings, Senator Humphrey wrote a 
memo to his colleagues that outlined reform options.139 In this memo, 
Senator Humphrey described one option, which was to ask the 
pharmaceutical industry to contribute funds to hire researchers who would 
be “entirely independent of [the] industry [and would] perform preclinical 
and clinical tests.”140 Another option, proposed by Dr. Harry Dowling, was 
to grant the FDA funds “to finance the testing of a drug by an independent 
agency . . . [when] the Administration was not satisfied with the evidence 
submitted by the manufacturer of the drug.”141 
The FDA was also worried about the quality of testing. Speaking 
before the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in 1966, FDA 
Commissioner James L. Goddard stated that he was: 
 
shocked at the materials that come in. In addition to the 
problem of quality, there is the problem of dishonesty in 
the investigational new drug stage [including] . . . the 
conscious withholding of unfavorable animal clinical data 
[and] . . . [t]he deliberate choice of clinical investigators 
known to be more concerned about industry friendships 
than in developing good data.142 
 
During this period, FDA officials met with industry representatives 
and specialists on research methodology to develop more rigorous testing 
procedures, which was followed by an FDA sponsored conference on drug 
 
 138. Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 5 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 2406 
(Exhibit 273, Article by Joseph R. Hixson, Herald Tribune). 
 139. See Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 4 (88th Cong.), supra note 100, at 1668–
69 (Exhibit 210) (explaining the history, past problems, current problems, and future problems in 
drug testing). 
 140. See id. at 1688 (Exhibit 210) (posing a number of reform options as questions, including 
whether the pharmaceutical industry should be asked to contribute funds to hire independent 
researchers). 
 141. Id. 
 142. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 51; see also, Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 2: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on 
Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 157 (1976) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2] 
(statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. 
Welfare) (summarizing the various problems in the drug industry and noting the need for reform 
in clinical testing). 
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testing.143 In 1970, the FDA promulgated regulations, which required drug 
testing to demonstrate safety and efficacy.144 
 
C.       1967–1979: The Nelson Hearings and Legislation 
 
Senator Gaylord Nelson investigated clinical trials and other matters 
from 1967–1979 as part of the hearings that he chaired on Competitive 
Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry.145 Individuals who testified 
proposed various reforms, which included shifting the responsibility for 
testing drugs to the federal government.146 
During the 1968–1969 hearings, several physicians advocated for the 
requirement of independent testing.147 Dr. Paul Lowinger, from the Wayne 
State University School of Medicine, proposed the creation of a federal 
agency, which would be funded by the federal government and/or the 
pharmaceutical industry to supervise drug research.148 This federal agency 
would test drugs, finance independent organizations to test drugs, or 
oversee drug trials.149 Investigators would report their findings to the 
 
 143. See Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 22: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 92d Cong. 8527 (1972) [hereinafter Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharm. Industry, Part 22] (statement of Charles C. Edwards, Comm’r, Food and Drug Admin.) 
(explaining the various steps of progress made within the FDA and the drug testing industry to 
ensure better testing procedures). 
 144. 21 C.F.R. § 146 (1970); see also Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, 
Part 22, supra note 143 (explaining the various changes that the FDA made to its regulations in 
order to improve drug testing). 
 145. See generally Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Parts 1-34: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90-96th Cong. (1967–1979) 
(discussing issues related to clinical trials and other issues in the pharmaceutical industry). These 
hearings, held from 1967 to 1979, are nicely summarized by two reports of the Congressional 
Research Service: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 53-690 O, COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE 
DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1979) [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY], and CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 
56-036, COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING: SUMMARY AND 
ANALYSIS (1972). 
 146. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 145, at 68–78. 
 147. See id. at 68 (explaining that various physicians/advocates for reform propose 
independent testing to ensure that drug testing is impartial and produces the fairest results 
possible). 
 148. See id.; see also, Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of 
Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 10: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 90th-91st Cong. 3997, 4001 (1969) [hereinafter 
Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10] (explaining the need for drug 
testing reform and the importance of government supervision). 
 149. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 145, at 68–69 
(explaining that the agency would be created to supervise and approve research methods). 
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agency instead of the drug sponsor.150 Dr. Dale Console, the former 
medical director of E. R. Squibb & Co., supported the creation of a central 
testing agency, which the federal government and pharmaceutical firms 
would jointly fund, and which would select investigators to conduct drug 
trials without the drug sponsors knowing their identity.151 
In contrast, Dr. Franz Inglefinger, editor of the New England Journal 
of Medicine, testified that independent testing, overseen by a government 
agency, would reduce the risk of bias, but that it might not be worth the 
cost.152 Dr. Inglefinger thought it was sufficient to require drug firms to 
contract with universities to perform clinical trials.153 
Dr. Donald Mainland, who coordinated research for the American 
Rheumatism Association’s Cooperating Clinics Committee, argued that 
drug firms could influence clinical trials when they were the intermediary 
between the FDA and researchers.154 Congress, he said, should “take the 
evaluation of drugs entirely out of the producer’s hands” after the 
completion of animal toxicological testing.155 He favored the creation of an 
independent, not-for-profit drug testing agency that would provide research 
grants in a manner similar to the NIH, noting that the agency should be 
funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry in a manner that did not 
allow it to “influence the disposal of the money or interfere . . . with the 
trials.”156 
Dr. Paul Lowinger of the Wayne State University School of Medicine 
proposed that Congress should create a National Institute of Pharmacology 
that would “supervis[e] and approv[e] research protocols for [drug] 
investigations . . . [,]” and would require drug firms to finance the clinical 
trials.157 Dr. George Nichols, of Harvard Medical School, also proposed the 
creation of a central agency to test drugs that drug firms and the federal 
 
 150. See id. at 69 (explaining that if results were reported to an independent agency, the 
impartiality of the testing would improve). 
 151. See Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 11: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 4478, 4481 (1969) (explaining that testing through a central 
agency that is jointly funded through the government and firms would increase the impartiality 
and fair results of testing). 
 152. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 4017, 
4024. 
 153. Id. at 4017, 4025. 
 154. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 7: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select 
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th Cong. 2775, 2777 (1968). 
 155. Id. (noting that the federal government is called upon to direct the impartiality of testing). 
 156. Id. at 2768–69. 
 157. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 3997, 
4001–04. 
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government would jointly finance in order to eliminate “questionable 
practices revolving around payment to investigators.”158 Dr. William B. 
Bean, head of internal medicine at the University of Iowa College of 
Medicine, supported having drug testing conducted by “a neutral judging 
body, professional competent, and quite independent of any extraneous 
source of financial support or any hint of obligation or connection with 
the . . . promoters of the drug.”159 
In 1968, NIH director Dr. James Shannon called for having a federal 
agency evaluate drugs when the FDA deemed that the data it received from 
manufacturers were insufficient.160 The agency would either conduct its 
own studies, or contract with independent institutions.161 Conversely, Dr. 
Harry Dowling, an authority on drug safety, responded that it might be 
better instead for the FDA to develop an in-house capacity to evaluate 
drugs.162 
In 1971, Senator Nelson introduced an omnibus drug bill that would 
create independent third-party drug testing.163 He summarized the problem 
that the bill sought to remedy as follows:164 
 
 
 158. Id. at 3977, 3985. 
 159. Id. at 3919, 3920. 
 160. DOWLING, supra note 16, at 230–32. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (commenting on the Shannon proposal, which was published in thei ha National 
Institutes of Health, “Drug Research Reports” (1968)). 
 163. S. 2812, 92d Cong. (1971). 
 164. The bill was included as part of an omnibus drug bill, S. 2812, in the 92d Congress. It was 
introduced as stand-alone legislation thereafter. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S. 
966, 93d Cong. (1973) (“[A bill t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as 
amended, to provide for the establishment of a national drug testing and evaluation center.”); 
National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Cong. (1975); National Drug Testing 
and Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Cong. (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of 
1979, S. 774, 96th Cong. (1979). Senator Nelson testified that he developed his proposal with 
FDA officials in 1969, while chairing the “Competitive Problems” hearings. See Preclinical & 
Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 156–57. In addition to creating a system for 
independent drug testing, S. 2812 would require that “in order for a new drug to be approved, it 
must be demonstrated that the new drug is safer or more effective than a drug already on the 
market.” 117 CONG. REC. 39,204–09 (1971) (statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson). For exposition 
and discussion on Nelson’s third-party testing proposal as described in S. 966, see Examination of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry: Legislation Amending the Public Health Service Act and the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & the Pub. Welfare, 93d-94th Cong. (1973-
1974). Also, see Sen. Nelson’s statement before the Kennedy subcommittee, in which he outlines 
more than a decade of statements by the FDA indicating that the problems of fraud and poorly 
designed studies were a problem of the past, and that stronger monitoring and inspections have 
eliminated the problem, which is available at Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, 
supra note 142, at 156–60. 
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the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a drug solely 
on the basis of information supplied by the drug company 
making the application. The dangers involved in the 
dependence on drug firms to perform, direct, or arrange for 
the testing of drugs in which they have a financial interest 
is obvious . . . . [T]here is an inevitable tendency—no 
matter how conscientious the firm—to emphasize the 
positive features and deemphasize the negative. Many of 
the people they engage to do their testing are equally 
anxious to secure additional contracts for drug testing . . . A 
physician who turns in unfavorable reports on the drugs he 
is testing may not have his contract renewed . . . . [S]ome 
firms have been guilty of misrepresenting, distorting, and 
even withholding information developed in their testing of 
drugs which may in any way retard or prevent an approval 
to market. Injury and death have resulted from such 
actions . . . . Testing of drugs should be done by specialists 
who have no direct relationship with the manufacturer, who 
cannot benefit financially from the results, [and] who are 
not motivated even subconsciously by the desire to get 
anything but the truth.165 
 
Senator Nelson introduced the omnibus bill again in 1973, and 
sponsored stand-alone bills for independent drug testing in each Congress 
until he lost his re-election bid in 1980.166 
The Nelson bill vested the federal government with responsibility for 
all testing of NDA and FDA drug reviews.167 The Nelson bill also 
authorized the creation of a National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center 
within the FDA to oversee clinical investigations of new drugs, which 
meant that the federal government would perform the tests either through 
 
 165. CONG. REC., supra note 164; see also Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, 
supra note 142, at 156 (Sen. Nelson explaining several years later that the current system was 
“inherently defective in that the promoter and beneficiary of the product which needs to be 
licensed and marketed controls all the studies that are made to prove its safety and its efficacy”). 
 166. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973); National Drug 
Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Cong. (1975); National Drug Testing and Evaluation 
Act, S. 630, 95th Cong. (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of 1979, S. 774, 96th 
Cong. (1979). See also Gaylord Nelson, DISCOVER THE NETWORKS: A GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL 
LEFT, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/individualProfile.asp?indid=1861 (last visited Nov. 7, 
2014) (detailing the political career of Senator Gaylord Nelson and his work while in office). 
 167. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 § 
102 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 55–56 
(1973) (examining the text of S. 966, 93d Cong. § 102 (1973)). 
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the testing center, or by contracting with independent organizations.168 The 
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”) 
would decide whether each drug would be tested through the national 
testing center or an independent organization.169 Drug companies would 
finance the testing center and the clinical trials by paying into a common 
fund, which the Secretary of HEW would draw from to pay for testing.170 
The Secretary would publicize the “methodology, results, and 
conclusions.”171 Drug sponsors could still conduct their own clinical trials, 
but they were subject to HEW regulations and public disclosure of the 
testing methods and results.172 
 
D.      1973–1980: The Kennedy Hearings 
 
Senator Ted Kennedy chaired hearings entitled “Examination of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry” in 1973–1974,173 as well as hearings entitled 
“Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry” from 
1975–1979.174 Kennedy also examined the Nelson proposal for 
independent drug testing, among other issues.175 
At the hearings in 1974 and 1976, which were held during the 
presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Charles Edwards (HEW 
Assistant Secretary for Health) and Alexander Schmidt (FDA 
Commissioner) opposed Senator Nelson’s proposed national drug-testing 
center.176 Commissioner Schmidt argued that economic incentives and tort 
 
 168. Id. at 56–57. 
 169. Id. at 55–56. 
 170. Id. at 55. 
 171. Id. at 63 (text of S. 966, 93d Cong. §102 (1973)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Legislation Amending the Public Health 
Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on 
S. 3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & the Pub. Welfare, 
93d-94th Cong. (1973–1974). 
 174. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 1–3: J. Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975–1976); 
Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Parts 4–5: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. (1977–
1978); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health & Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong. 
(1979) [hereinafter Preclinical & Clinical Testing (1979)]. 
 175. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 161. 
 176. See Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 5: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 2162 
(1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5] (opposing the proposal for a 
National Drug-Testing center); Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 
160 (proposing instead a progressive series of steps to evaluate and reform the existing system). 
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liability created an incentive for drug firms to carry out proper studies,177 
and that the “professional integrity of toxicologists in the industry” helped 
to assure high quality investigations.178 Commissioner Schmidt noted that 
having the federal government or independent labs perform the work would 
not necessarily improve the quality of testing.179 Furthermore, 
Commissioner Schmidt announced that the FDA would create regulations 
to assure “good laboratory practice[s]” in animal testing, would inspect 
animal testing facilities, and would audit or review any data where there 
was suspicion of falsification.180 
Commissioner Schmidt also reported that the FDA had rejected the 
idea of drug testing under federal auspices,181 as it was not feasible in the 
short term since the federal government lacked sufficient personnel and 
testing facilities.182 Moreover, due to the dearth of independent 
laboratories, it was not possible to have independent third parties perform 
the tests.183 Schmidt also argued that it would be too costly to have the 
federal government test drugs, as “there is no way that we can get the 
resources to put into this that drug companies do.”184 Furthermore, Schmidt 
argued that he believed “all monopolies, whether public or private, tend to 
stagnate, [so] the prospect of any single institution gaining such control 
over all preclinical drug investigation troubles me.”185 
Both Commissioner Schmidt and HEW Assistant Secretary Edwards 
testified that having the FDA engage in or select firms to perform drug 
testing would mire the FDA in conflicting roles because the FDA would 
 
 177. See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2163 (statement of 
Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (“Senator, you are assuming that we could do it better than 
industry, and I have some disagreement with that. I think the problem is not the system per se, but 
in the monitoring that we carry on of the system. We have underway at FDA, and have had for a 
couple of years an improved surveillance system of these clinical investigations that are being 
carried on behalf of the manufacturer. There is nothing wrong with the system. It is good, but we 
have over the years done a very poor job of surveillance, if you will, but I think first of all there is 
not enough talent to go around in terms of having the drug industry involved in clinical testing 
along with the Federal Government.”). See also Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, 
supra note 142, at 92–93 (statement of Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (discussing economic 
incentives, such as the pharmaceutical industry’s practice of cross-checking data with competitors, 
and liability implications stemming from marketing an unsafe product). 
 178. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 45. 
 179. Id. at 103–04. 
 180. Id. at 47–48. 
 181. Id. at 103–04. 
 182. Id. at 104. 
 183. See id. (discussing challenges presented by the insufficiency of independent laboratories 
in number and capacity to handle large numbers of studies). 
 184. Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2164–65. 
 185. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 103. 
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ultimately evaluate the research performed under its aegis.186 Edwards 
contended that “the public would be deprived of . . . FDA impartial review 
of clinical data.”187 Commissioner Schmidt claimed that all that was needed 
to ensure reliable trials was increased FDA oversight that is supported by 
FDA authority to issue subpoenas, examine records, and conduct 
investigations.188 Edwards rebutted, however, with the opinion that a 
government center would not necessarily do a better job of testing than drug 
firms, and that industry bias could be countered through increased 
government surveillance.189 
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“PMA”) and the 
AMA both opposed the creation of a national drug testing and evaluation 
center.190 PMA president, Joseph Stetler, argued that the proposal 
incorrectly assumed “that scientists will somehow be more objective if their 
work is done under government rather than private aegis,”191 and that 
creating the center would lead to a “drastic slowing down of drug 
research.”192 Speaking for the AMA, Dr. James Sammons argued that 
creating an FDA drug testing center would transform the FDA from a judge 
of research that was conducted by others into an organization that judged its 
own research.193 
Meanwhile, further investigations and hearings found that many 
clinical trials did not comply with legal requirements or research norms.194 
The FDA investigations of G. D. Searle in the early 1970s revealed poor 
oversight, negligence, and fraud in the firm’s toxicological drug testing.195 
 
 186. Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 5, supra note 176, at 2163–65 (statement of 
Charles C. Edwards, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare). 
 187. Id. at 2163. 
 188. Id. at 2164–65. 
 189. Id. at 2163 (“There is nothing wrong with the system. . . . [B]ut we have . . . done a very 
poor job of surveillance . . . .”). 
 190. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 6: Hearings on S. 3441 and S. 966 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 2419, 
2535 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 6]. 
 191. Id. at 2526. 
 192. Id. at 2494. 
 193. Id. at 2545, 2572–73 (statement of James H. Sammons, Executive Vice President 
Designate, American Medical Association). Both the PMA and AMA opposed another aspect of 
the proposal: the idea that drug trials should compare the effectiveness of new drugs to those on 
the market, and that the FDA should consider comparative effectiveness when deciding whether to 
authorize the sale of a new drug. Id. 
 194. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 337–39. 
 195. See id. at 24–42 (memorandum from Searle Investigation Task Force to Searle 
Investigation Steering Committee) (showing the results of the investigation dealing with the 
integrity of animal data, which G. D. Searle & Co. submitted to the FDA in support of the safety 
of its products, and highlighting issues such as inadequate training, delayed necropsy of animals, 
and unexplained alterations in records). 
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The FDA found “a pattern of conduct[,] which compromises the scientific 
integrity of the studies.”196 At the 1976 hearings, Gregory J. Ahart reported 
that a Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) investigation concluded 
that there is “a lack of assurance that the data . . . upon which FDA bases its 
decision to approve a new drug . . . is accurate and reliable.”197 
Subsequently, the FDA developed regulations for Good Laboratory 
Practices (“GLP”),198 and introduced bio-research monitoring and 
inspection.199 A 1977 study found poor compliance with these standards;200 
by 1979, however, compliance had risen to 88%.201 
Congressional testimony in 1976 made clear that there were then two 
types of problems with drug testing: first, manufacturers’ bias compromised 
impartiality, and second, cost pressures led organizations to perform poor 
 
 196. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 3: Joint Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on 
Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 4 (1976) [hereinafter 
Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3]. An FDA survey of 155 clinical investigators 
between 1972 and 1974 found that 74% did not comply with one or more legal requirements, 28% 
did not adhere to the study protocol, 23% did not keep accurate records of the patients' condition 
before, during, and after trial, and 22% did not retain case records. Preclinical & Clinical Testing 
Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 340. 
 197. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 335. Specifically, Mr. 
Ahart made the following points regarding the GAO’s findings. Before 1974, there was no 
comprehensive monitoring plan. Since 1972, when the FDA began a special survey of clinical 
investigators, it found that most clinical investigators were not fully compliant, and that most 
sponsors were not adequately monitoring their investigators. Id. at 364–65. In a survey conducted 
from 1972–74, the FDA found significant (74%) noncompliance with a number of requirements. 
Id. at 365. It identified failure in: obtaining patient consent—35%; keeping accurate records of the 
amount of drugs received from sponsors and distributed to subjects—50%; adhering to study 
protocol—28%; maintaining accurate records reflecting the condition of the patient before, during, 
and after the study, and the nature of the laboratory work done and other therapy administered 
during the study—23%; retaining case records as required—22%; and properly supervising the 
study—12%. Id. FDA inspections of sample groups of clinical investigations under the Bureau of 
Drugs, the Bureau of Biologics, and of federally sponsored clinical investigations all reviewed the 
same types of deficiencies. Id. at 366–67. The FDA did develop a “comprehensive plan for 
clinical investigation evaluation” in 1975 that was intended to enhance/remedy the monitoring 
efforts, but as of January 1976, it was not yet fully implemented. The FDA made only sparing use 
of its enforcement tools to improve clinical investigations. In the period following the ‘62 
amendments, there were only two criminal prosecutions, regulatory letters have been used only 
once by the Bureau of Biologics and not at all by the Bureau of Drugs, and the two bureaus 
combined disqualified only 30 investigators. Id. at 368–69. 
 198. Good Laboratory Practice for Nonclinical Laboratory Studies, 21 C.F.R. § 58 (2011). 
 199. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CHAPTER 48–BIORESEARCH MONITORING, 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE MANUAL (2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/ucm133765.p
df (providing guidance for nonclinical laboratories on compliance with Good Laboratory Practice 
requirements). 
 200. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 82–83. 
 201. See MARCEL DEKKER, INC., GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICE REGULATIONS 35 (Sandy 
Weinberg ed., 3d ed. 2003).   
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quality work.202 Having a governmental agency rather than the 
manufacturer select the organization that performs the tests would eliminate 
bias.203 Other measures were needed, however, to control for poor quality 
work due to economic pressures.204 Officials from the National Cancer 
Institute described the procedures that they used to ensure that testing by 
outside firms was of high quality.205 Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Public 
Citizen’s Health Research Group (“HRG”) argued that “what we learn . . . 
is not to allow any more testing by industry or by companies, who owe their 
allegiance to industry,” further explaining that “no kind of surveillance of 
any kind over conflicted and inadequate data is going to improve the quality 
of it.”206 
In 1978, Senator Kennedy renewed his hearings, and testimony and 
documents revealed continued negligence, fraud, and fabrication of data.207 
Another theme that the hearings explored concerned the dependence of 
toxicological laboratories on drug firms for their continued operation.208 
Would the toxicological laboratories’ dependence induce these labs to 
engage in fraud due to fear that the drug firms would not renew the labs’ 
contract if they reported unfavorable results? Some witnesses suggested that 
 
 202. See generally Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 14 
(statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on 
Labor & Pub. Welfare and the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary) (“Many decisions made in the course of designing, conducting and reporting studies 
tended to minimize the chances of discovering toxicity and to allay possible FDA concern.”); 
Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 13 (statement of Alexander 
Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (discussing various lapses in integrity, including instances where 
employees of laboratory subcontractors “were instructed to falsify data by their employer”). 
 203. See infra Part III.A (addressing objections to independent testing). 
 204. See infra Part III.B (discussing approaches to eliminate economic pressures and conflicts 
of interests for research organizations selected by the federal government). 
 205. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 147–55 
(testimony of Frank J. Rauscher, Jr., Director, National Cancer Institute); see also BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 85, at 104–06 (summarizing Dr. Schmidt’s testimony, which reviews the points 
covered by Dr. Rauscher). 
 206. Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 691 (statement of Dr. 
Sidney Wolfe, Public Citizens Health Research Group). 
 207. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 5: Hearings on 
Examination of The Process of Drug Testing and FDA’s Role in the Regulation and Conditions 
Under Which Such Testing is Carried Out Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research 
of the Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 7–8 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) 
(discussing case reports on “fictitious subjects, and on subjects who were never administered the 
investigational drug they were supposed to have received,” and case reports “containing the 
results of clinical laboratory work which was not actually performed”). 
 208. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 139 (statement of 
John R. Quarles, Deputy Administrator of the EPA) (“[A] laboratory might be so dependent upon 
a pesticide producer for contract work that its independent scientific judgment could be impaired 
by the close economic relationship.”). See also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 80 (“One of the 
issues raised by the Searle investigations was the relationship between contract laboratories and 
large pharmaceutical companies.”). 
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drug firms instructed laboratories to fabricate data, a practice called “dry-
labeling.”209 Other witnesses and senators expressed concern that drug 
testers either failed to record data, or that drug testers fabricated data as a 
means to ensure that manufacturers would continue to employ them.210 
 
E.      The Carter Administration Report on New Drug Regulation 
 
During the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) Review Panel on New Drug 
Regulation concluded that the current system was flawed since the “FDA 
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industry-
generated data[,] . . . [and b]ecause the company has a financial interest in 
successful test results, the present drug testing system contains an inherent 
bias.”211 The review panel explained that “[t]he most direct means of 
minimizing the bias in testing is to have research conducted by investigators 
who are financially independent of the drug sponsor.”212 The panel noted 
that the disadvantage of having the federal government conduct clinical 
trials was that “[i]f such testing were undertaken by the FDA, the agency 
would be in the untenable position of passing upon the result of its own 
research.”213 The panel, therefore, preferred a system under which “the 
government would be responsible for hiring and paying independent 
researchers, with the cost of research assessed to the sponsor,” and where 
“[t]he information produced would be given to both the pharmaceutical 
sponsor and the FDA for analysis.”214 
 
 
 
 
 
 209. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 196, at 13 (statement of 
Alexander Schmidt, FDA Comm’r) (noting that “[s]ome of the laboratory determinations alleged 
to have been carried out were found by the FDA investigators not to been carried out at all,” 
otherwise “called ‘dry-labeling’ by some,” which means “[t]hat data sheets are simply filled out 
by individuals who know the range of values to submit, and put out the data sheets”); 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 85, at 80 (“[Can] pharmaceutical companies use their commercial 
power to impose a set of expectations on contract laboratories whereby unfavorable results cause 
the laboratory to believe that it will be unlikely to get future contracts?”). 
 210. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 139–42, 158–59 
(noting that drug companies concealed information and made falsified statements to the FDA, and 
there are problems when self-interested industries control the studies). 
 211. NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION 83 (1977). 
 212. Id. at 85–86. 
 213. Id. at 88. 
 214. Id. at 89. 
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F.      The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 
 
In 1978, the FDA and HEW supported the Drug Regulation Reform 
Act of 1978, sponsored by Senator Kennedy and nine other senators.215 The 
bill would have reformed the drug review process, and created some 
governmental capacity to evaluate drugs.216 The bill also would have 
increased the FDA’s role in overseeing the design and implementation of 
testing protocols, while requiring increased disclosure of clinical trial 
data.217 
The bill proposed a “National Center for Clinical Pharmacology” to 
conduct some intramural public clinical pharmacology research.218 The 
Center’s functions consisted of “conduct[ing] and support[ing] research in 
clinical pharmacology and clinical pharmacy, including investigations for: 
(1) the safety and effectiveness of existing and new uses of drug products, 
(2) the development of drug products for diseases and other conditions of 
low incidence, [and] (3) drug products of special significance or with 
respect to which there is substantial controversy as to safety and 
effectiveness.”219 The pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and some 
consumer advocates opposed the reform, and as a result, the bill was never 
reported out of the committee.220 
 
 215. 124 CONG. REC. 2,755 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (indicating nine 
co-sponsors: Cranston, Eagleton, Hathaway, Javits, Nelson, Pell, Randolph, Riegle, and 
Williams). 
 216. See JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DRUG REGULATION 
REFORM ACT OF 1978 SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS i–viii (1978) (indicating subparts of the 
bill governing approval of drug entities and drug products and noting the requirements for: 
dispensing, labeling, distribution, licensing, manufacturing, components, packaging, registration, 
investigation, exporting, practitioners, and standards for safety). 
 217. See id. at 97 (“Subsection (f) establishes the requirements for the conduct of a drug 
innovation investigation [including] (1) confining distribution of the drug to experts qualified to 
investigate the drug or the disease under [the] study; (2) preventing the drug from being dispensed 
by investigators other than those specified to conduct the investigation; (3) conducting the 
investigation in accordance with the protocol submitted in the registration; (4) maintaining 
records, and submitting reports to the Secretary, regarding the investigation so that the Secretary 
may determine whether the conditions of registration are being fulfilled; (5) reporting to the 
Secretary information of newly discovered risks so that the Secretary may determine whether 
participants are being subjected to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury; (6) 
complying with the requirements in section 130 regarding protection of human subjects in 
research; and (7) not promoting or commercializing the drug product.”). 
 218. See id. at 193–94 (noting that § 201 “amends the Public Health Service Act by . . . 
establish[ing] a National Center for Clinical Pharmacology. . . . [and] authoriz[ing] the Center to 
conduct and support research in clinical pharmacology . . . ”). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Oversight: The Food and Drug Administration’s Process for Approving New Drugs: 
Hearings on H.R. 37 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research, & Tech. of the Comm. on Sci. & 
Tech., 96th Cong. 315, 317, 389, 419, 564–65 (1979) (noting that the President of the 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association on the Drug Approval Process of the FDA rejected the 
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Senator Kennedy’s 1979 hearings documented continued problems 
with research fraud,221 and FDA audits also revealed continued fraud and 
flawed research.222 In the 1980 election where Ronald Reagan was elected 
President, Senator Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for re-election, and the 
Senate majority shifted from the Democratic Party to the Republican 
Party.223 These changes ended the congressional proposals for independent 
drug testing.224 Discussion of independent drug testing in medical and 
popular journals then virtually ceased until the 1990s. 
 
III.      REVISITING PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING 
 
A.      Assessing the Arguments Against Independent Drug Testing 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, opponents argued that independent drug 
testing was not feasible because there were insufficient independent private 
organizations to conduct toxicological tests and clinical trials, and 
additionally argued that the federal government lacked the capacity to 
perform this work.225 These assertions assumed that private firms and the 
federal government could not expand their capacities to meet new 
demands.226 
 
reform, that Dr. Moulton, advocate for the National Consumer League, disagreed with FDA 
reform, and that the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 failed to secure congressional 
approval). See also H.R. 12980 (95th): Drug Regulation Reform Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/95/hr12980 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (“This bill was 
introduced on June 5, 1978, in a previous session of Congress, but was not enacted.”). 
 221. Preclinical & Clinical Testing, (1979), supra note 174, at 12–13 (statement of Sherwin 
Gardner, Deputy Comm’r, FDA). 
 222. See id. at 10 (noting that the FDA “[found] a number of investigators whose work 
represents sloppy science, disregard for the rights of test subjects, and misrepresentation of test 
data”). 
 223. See Peter Temin, Government Actions in Times of Crisis: Lessons from the History of 
Drug Regulation, 18 J. SOC. HIST. 433, 437 (noting that Ronald Regan was elected and the 
Democrats lost the Sentate); Demetrios Caraley, Do Congressional Liberals Really Need to 
Tremble? A Quick Look at Some Hard Data, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 27, 28 (1981) (noting that Gaylord 
Nelson lost in the Senate). 
 224. See Stuart J. Land, Current Issues Relating to FDA Regulation of New Drugs, 38 FOOD 
DRUG COSM. L.J. 29, 29–34 (1983) (“In a period of deregulation [and d]uring a time of personnel 
reductions,” “the present policy is chilling the publication of clinical research results,” as 
“progress is slow in the OTC Drug Review. . . . [T]he pace is glacier-like.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Drug Research & Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 81, at 1053, 1060–
61, 1261 (noting that a study for toxicological drug testing shows that drug testing is too complex, 
timely, costly, and energy-consuming, so it should be sufficient to have briefer and less thorough 
investigations; additionally, while the FDA needs greater competency, a national organization for 
the objective evaluation of drugs is not an easily attained goal). 
 226. See id. at 1041, 1060–61 (“Assuming the majority still believe[s] our Government should 
do only what cannot be, or is not, done by private agencies, the present situation and probable 
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The opponent’s arguments were probably not correct then, and the 
arguments are certainly not true now. Today, rather than test drugs in-
house, manufacturers contract out this work.227 Initially, universities 
performed most of this research, but over the last quarter century, drug 
firms shifted most of their clinical trials to for-profit CROs, which now 
constitutes a global industry.228 Yet, testing by third parties still is not 
independent today.229 Manufacturers either design the clinical trial or direct 
and oversee the researchers who do, and manufacturers also select the 
organization that conducts the research.230 Researchers, whether in CROs 
or universities, depend on the drug manufacturer for their income and must 
follow the manufacturer’s directions if they want to receive continued 
funding.231 
Public policy could promote the independence of existing contract 
research organizations and universities if a governmental agency selected 
both the entity that performed the clinical trials and monitored its work.232 
Furthermore, by allocating funds for the research, the agency could spur the 
growth of organizations with high standards for integrity, quality, and 
independence.233 For example, the internationally recognized Mario Negri 
Pharmacological Institute has performed independent clinical trials in 
Europe for nearly 50 years, has published more than 13,000 original 
scientific papers in scientific journals, and now conducts about 80 clinical 
trials a year.234 
 
trends seem to call for a magnitude of resources and effort far beyond the capacities of any 
combination of private enterprises.”). 
 227. See Maysoun D. Masri et al., Contract Research Organizations: An Industry Analysis 5 
INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTHCARE MARKETING 2, 5 (2007) (noting that pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology manufacturers utilize CROs more and more to conduct research endeavors at a 
greater speed and less cost). 
 228. See id. at 12–13, 18 (noting a clear shift toward globalization of clinical trials); Richard A. 
Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF. 129, 141 (2000) (noting a shift 
to CROs). 
 229. See Rettig, supra note 228, at 134 (noting that some firms manage their own trials, with 
most employing a hybrid form of internally and outsourced management, while drug firms usually 
recruit for and design trials followed by a NDA submission to the FDA). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See Jill A. Fisher & Corey A. Kalbaugh, United States Private-Sector Physicians and 
Pharmaceutical Contract Research: A Qualitative Study, 9 PLOS MED. 2, 4–6 (2012) (noting that 
sponsoring companies influence physicians’ opinions and decisions through financial pressures). 
 232. See supra Part III.A (providing a solution to sever the CROs and universities’ reliance on 
a manufacturer’s directions). 
 233. See supra Part III.A (explaining how public policy separates the CROs and universities’ 
dependence on a manufacturer’s income and direction). 
 234. See MARIO NEGI INST. FOR PHARMACOLOGICAL RES., http://www.marionegri.it/mn/en 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (describing the Institute as a “not-for-profit biomedical research 
organization. . . . [that] started work in Milan on 1 February 1963. . . . and ‘has published more 
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Independent testing, its opponents also argued, would not ensure that 
clinical trials were well designed or conducted competently.235 Even if a 
governmental agency selected the researchers, the researchers might 
perform sloppy work or engage in fraud.236 No doubt, independent testing 
alone is not sufficient to ensure accurate results.237 Nevertheless, 
independent testing eliminates the biggest problem: bias.238 Moreover, the 
National Cancer Institute’s experience in contracting with laboratories to 
test chemicals demonstrates that regulators can monitor and control the 
quality of contracted testing.239 
Opponents also claimed that having the federal government test drugs 
would mire the FDA in conflicts of interest because the government would 
both conduct clinical trials and also evaluate those trials when deciding 
whether or not to approve drugs.240 There is irony in opposing government 
drug testing as a means to avoid conflicts of interest. The rationale for 
government-sponsored testing is to remove the conflict of interest that is 
present when a firm evaluates its products.241 The issue, therefore, is 
whether government-sponsored testing would result in evaluations that 
were more or less biased than when a manufacturer tested its own products. 
Drug manufactures have a systematic bias in favor of their products,242 
while governmental agencies do not have a bias in favor of or against any 
particular product.243 Certainly, some individual governmental personnel 
might harbor a bias towards a firm or a product, but that would not 
systematically slant all testing.244 
 
than 10,000 articles in prestigious international scientific journals and several books and congress 
proceedings’”).   
 235. See Masri et al., supra note 227, at 2, 19 (noting that clinical trials present concerns of 
accuracy, quality, ethics, and safety). 
 236. See, e.g., Rettig, supra note 228, at 130 (noting that the FDA halted FDA-regulated trials 
at the University of Colorado that were not reviewed by its IRB within the prior year). 
 237. See id. at 142 (noting concerns of suppression of research results by drug firms, bias in 
interpreting inconclusive research, and ghost authorship of articles). 
 238. See Joel Lexchin, Those Who Have the Gold Make the Evidence: How the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Biases the Outcomes of Clinical Trials of Medications, 18 SCI. & 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 248, 257 (2012) (noting that bias could be reduced if the industry left the 
planning and monitoring of the research design in the hands of the researchers). 
 239. See Preclinical & Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 142, at 144. 
 240. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
 241. See supra text accompanying note 206. 
 242. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 243. See supra text accompanying note 241. 
 244. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR CLINIC TRIAL SPONSORS, 
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA MONITORING COMMITTEES 7 
(2006) (highlighting how the current use of separate adjudication committees in clinical trials 
ensure data that is as accurate and bias-free as possible).  
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It is easy to avoid bias if a government agency evaluated the quality 
and results of its own work by simply having one government agency 
perform the clinical trials, and a separate and independent agency 
evaluating those trials.245 In fact, government agencies frequently evaluate 
the work of other government programs.246 For example, the Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”), an independent agency, evaluates the 
performance of federal programs.247 GAO reports are a model of objective 
evaluation, and are highly regarded.248 It is also possible for the FDA to 
avoid evaluating any work performed by governmental employees or 
programs by having the NIH select independent contractors, who would 
then perform the clinical trials.249 Then the FDA would evaluate the 
research performed in the private sector, just as it does today.250 The key 
difference would be that the researchers would not be dependent on, 
influenced by, or chosen by the drug sponsor. 
Currently, it requires about 15 years from the beginning of drug 
development until a drug can be marketed.251 Phase I clinical trials in 
humans take about a year and a half, Phase II clinical trials typically take 
two years, and Phase III clinical trials take three to five years.252 Opponents 
of independent testing also claim that independent testing would slow the 
 
 245. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244 (indicating that the current 
use of distinct adjudication committees in clinical trials is a successful mode of bias elimination). 
 246. See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 
(Feb. 22, 2002) (explaining that Congress directed the Office of Management and Budget to issue 
guidelines for governmental agencies that ensure quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of 
information, and to require that these agencies implement administrative mechanisms permitting 
access to information about non-compliance with these guidelines). 
 247. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-5SP, SUMMARY OF GAO’S 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587949.pdf (describing the GAO’s duties as including the 
examination of public funds, evaluating federal programs and policies, and providing analyses, 
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed decisions). 
 248. See id. at i (highlighting the integrity aspect of the agency by stating that they take an 
“objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced approach” to all of their 
activities); see also Noah B. Bleicher et al., Accountability in Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-
Quantity Contracting: The Multifaceted Work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 37 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 375, 413 (2008) (acknowledging the GAO’s ability to provide objective, 
balanced analyses in the ID/IQ contracting field). 
 249. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245. 
 250. See id. (proposing having the FDA shift the responsibility for the conduct of clinical trials 
from sponsors to independent researchers and their institutions). 
 251. See ROWBERG, supra note 34, at 13 (providing a graph showing that the entire 
pharmaceutical drug process takes an average of 15 years from the inception of drug development 
to market approval). 
 252. Id. at 9–11. 
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introduction of new drugs,253 but this assertion is unpersuasive. 
Independent testing is unlikely to cause much delay because there is no 
reason that researchers chosen by the NIH should perform work more 
slowly than researchers chosen by a pharmaceutical firm. It might take a 
governmental agency longer than a drug firm to select which researchers to 
employ, but not much.254 If it takes more time in developing the research 
protocol to ensure that clinical trials are better designed and 
methodologically sound, then that would be time well spent. Moreover, 
there are ways to take care of the problems that any delay would cause for 
manufacturers.255 The Hatch-Waxman Act already extends for up to five 
years the period of market exclusivity that manufacturers of new drugs 
receive, which compensates manufacturers for part of the time that it takes 
them to conduct clinical trials and for the FDA to review NDAs.256 
Regulations could increase the period of market exclusivity in order to 
account for any increased time taken to conduct clinical trials using the new 
process. 
 
B.       Controlling Conflicts of Interests of Research Organizations 
Engaged by the Government 
 
Having a government agency select the private organization that 
conducts clinical trials would not necessarily remove all conflicts of 
interest. There exists potential bias if the researchers with which the federal 
government contracted with depended on drug manufacturers for most of 
their research income.257 The manufacturer could cease to employ the 
researchers in the future, or retaliate in other ways if the researchers 
produced negative evaluations of the manufacturer’s products for 
 
 253. See Examination of the Pharm. Industry, Part 6, supra note 190, at 2494 (criticizing an 
independent National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center because the drug progress would 
diminish since new products could not be approved unless it had a “significantly greater safety 
effectiveness” than current market-approved drugs). 
 254. Present Status of Competition in the Pharm. Industry, Part 10, supra note 148, at 4025 
(statement of Dr. Franz Ingelfinger, editor of the New England Journal of Medicine) (arguing that 
a study with a potentially large financial gain would take time to pick from an extensive list of 
independent investigators, while a relatively dull study would also cause delay since it will be 
difficult to interest good researchers). 
 255. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2012) (providing extensions for patents that were subject 
to regulatory review before they were commercially marketed). 
 256. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1602 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35 U.S.C.). 
 257. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 81, at 13934. 
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government-sponsored testing.258 Additionally, the risk of losing contracts 
from drug manufacturers could bias the evaluations of researchers. 
The most effective way to address this problem is to prohibit all firms 
and organizations that accept federal contracts for drug evaluation from 
performing any direct work for drug manufacturers. Fewer research 
organizations could thrive without doing any work for drug firms, however, 
and adopting this rule would reduce the pool of organizations willing to 
accept federal drug contracts;259 this might make it difficult for the federal 
government to find research organizations capable of performing high 
quality work. 
An alternative strategy is to reduce the degree of financial dependence 
rather than eliminating it entirely. The agency awarding drug evaluation 
contracts could offer work only to CROs or universities that earned 40% or 
less of their research revenue from drug manufacturers. Regulations could 
also direct the agency to give preference in awarding contracts to well 
qualified organizations that received 10% or less of their revenue from drug 
manufacturers.  
To further reduce the risk of bias while improving the quality of 
clinical trials, the federal government could also contract with experts to 
evaluate the proposed research design and protocol before authorizing the 
start of the clinical trial. It makes sense to require public disclosure of the 
proposed research protocol and the review of experts that evaluated it, and 
to allow the public to comment on the proposed research protocol. Based on 
the expert evaluation and public comments, the government agency could 
ask the research organization to revise its trial design and research protocol 
as needed. 
 
C.      Begin Independent Testing With New Drugs 
 
We can distinguish among three categories of drug trials: (1) those 
used to support NDAs; (2) post-marketing trials required by the FDA as a 
 
 258. This sort of conflict of interest also occurs when independent medical review 
organizations evaluate decisions of insurers to deny medical services. Even when public 
authorities select the review organization, the review organizations often depend on the insurer 
whose decisions they assess. Typically, these review organizations earn much of their income 
from performing other work for insurers. Insurers that are displeased with a decision of an 
independent review organization can select another organization to employ for this work. See 
Marc A. Rodwin, New Standards for Medical Review Organizations: Holding Them and Health 
Plans Accountable for Their Decisions, 30 HEALTH AFF. 519, 519–20 (2011). 
 259. See Bekelman et al., supra note 12 (stating that approximately one-fourth of biomedical 
researchers at academic institutions receive funding from the drug industry, one-third of lead 
authors in published articles have financial interests, and two-thirds of academic institutions have 
financial interests in businesses that sponsor their faculty research). 
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condition for granting marketing approval; and (3) other post-marketing 
approval trials not required by the FDA.260 Independent testing should start 
with clinical trials to support NDAs.261 
Federal law already requires that drug companies submit evidence on 
drug safety and effectiveness, and to specify how to conduct these trials 
when the drug companies seek approval to market a new drug.262 The FDA 
probably then has authority to promulgate regulations that require that such 
clinical trials be designed and conducted by an independent organization 
that is selected and supervised by a federal agency. Congress also could 
create this requirement by amending the FDCA, and firms would have to 
comply because with legislative change, they would have no alternative.  
The FDA also has jurisdiction over certain post-marketing trials 
because regulations require that manufacturers monitor the risks of drugs 
that they market, and that manufacturers submit results from their post-
marketing trials to the FDA.263 Sometimes the FDA specifies the kind of 
post-marketing trials that a drug manufacturer must perform, particularly if 
the NDA revealed potential serious drug risks.264 The FDA or Congress 
could require that drug firms finance independent clinical trials for those 
post-marketing studies. It is hard for the FDA to ensure that drug firms 
complete post-marketing studies because the FDA lacks the ability to 
routinely stop a manufacturer from marketing an approved drug.265 In 
contrast, regulatory authorities in the European Union have such power 
 
 260. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012) (indicating that the FDA requires premarketing strategies in 
addition to post-marketing strategies for an already approved drug if new safety information 
surfaces and the strategy is necessary to make sure the benefits of the product outweigh the risks). 
See also Lance L. Shea et al., Cause and Effect? Assessing Postmarketing Safety Studies As 
Evidence of Causation in Products Liability Cases, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 445, 447 (2007) (stating 
that the FDA can request, without compelling by regulation, a sponsor to conduct post-marketing 
studies indicating that there are trials being conducted that are not FDA required). 
 261. See Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry's Responsibility for Protecting 
Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 84 
(2004) (indicating that current Institutional Review Boards have no external review after pre-trial 
protocol approval, and are not independent of the institutions they are reviewing, leading to a lack 
of accountability). 
 262. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012). 
 263. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012). 
 264. 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.80–.81 (2001). 
 265. Until enactment of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA 
lacked the authority to compel drug firms to conduct post-marketing studies of approved drugs. 
See Peter Chang, Reauthorization of Pdufa: An Exercise in Post-Market Drug Safety Reform, 36 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 197 (2008). Drug firms often did not complete or delayed conducting 
these studies. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB’L NO. 
OEI-01-04-00390, FDA'S MONITORING OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS 11 (2006), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-04-00390.pdf. See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
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because authorization to market a new drug expires after five years unless 
the European Medicine Agency approves a renewal application.266 
Therefore, the FDA would need Congress to grant the FDA new powers, 
which would be similar to the regulatory authorities in the European Union 
in order to ensure that firms carried out these trials. 
Drug firms also conduct clinical trials for approved drugs that are not 
required by the FDA, and will often compare the efficacy of one drug to 
another to help market their products.267 It will be much harder to require 
these trials to be independently conducted, because manufacturers are not 
required to conduct these clinical trials and they therefore have the option of 
not funding such clinical trials.268 If Congress wants independent clinical 
trials to evaluate the comparative efficacy of approved drugs, then Congress 
will probably need to finance these studies. In the end, the best solution is 
for Congress to pass legislation that requires manufacturers to submit such 
data to the FDA, which would then give the FDA jurisdiction over such 
research. 
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